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Conclusions
Over the past 20-25 years, the number of products and services that are regarded as essential has expanded,
partly in response to cultural and technical changes, for example, mobile phones are increasingly seen as
essential items. The expansion is also in response to the recognition that, in a modern society, government has
a responsibility to ensure that all citizens have access to affordable products and services, not just for those
needed for physical survival but also for those required for ‘social inclusion’.1
At the same time, there has been a significant trend to privatise and marketise the ownership and provision of
products and services that were, in a number of cases, previously supplied by publicly owned monopoly
companies (telecoms and energy) or where markets were much less developed than they are now (financial
services and public transport). The onus is now firmly on consumers to ensure they are getting value for money
by exploiting the market. But this report shows that, for many of the essential purchases examined, this is not
always a realistic prospect for all households, especially low-income households. In addition, the markets
themselves are not always efficient or delivering the benefits expected of them because, for example, they are
highly concentrated or price comparisons are difficult to make.
Increases in global commodity prices, particularly food and energy, and the impact of the ‘credit crunch’ on
financial services and housing costs have placed huge pressure on household budgets. Increasing energy
prices will have a knock-on effect on transport prices, while water companies are generally asking for above
inflation price increases for the five years from 2010. Only in communications is there an expectation that
prices will increase by less than the rate of inflation. So the essential products and services covered here are
expected to absorb a larger proportion of low-income households’ budgets for some time to come, causing real
hardship.
For more than 30 years, the ‘poor pay more’ phenomenon has been recognised by consumer and welfare
organisations, for example by the National Consumer Council (NCC) in the 1970s.2 However, the combination
of the ‘Perfect Storm’ of the ‘credit crunch’ and rapidly rising food and energy commodity prices, have had a
punitive impact on low-income household budgets, and has highlighted that the problem of the ‘poor pay more’
remains at least as serious a problem as it was 30 years ago.
For various reasons, this sees low-income households having to pay more to receive the same (or sometimes
an inferior) product or service than more affluent households. So, for example, households that do not own
cars and have to shop frequently at small local stores have to pay more for their food than those that can profit
from a weekly shop at a large supermarket. For energy, this issue is most clearly illustrated by the high relative
price consumers using prepayment meters – an inferior form of service to other forms of billing – have to pay
for their energy.
NCC returned to the theme of the ‘poor pay more’ in 2004,3 seeking to stimulate a debate on the provision of
essential services for low-income households.  It again found that low-income households were ‘paying more,
getting less’ and placed much of the blame on the increased role of competitive markets in supplying these
services. It stated:4
Increasingly government has encouraged the private sector in the supply of essentials. This can be
seen in the privatisation of national industries and the introduction of competition, mixed models of
provision in public services and the withdrawal of public subsidies from public services. But
competition is not serving the needs of the most disadvantaged. Public service rationing increasingly
bars those with greatest need. Disadvantaged consumers are excluded either because they lack the
skills to negotiate complex markets and systems, they are too costly to serve or they lack purchasing
power. Market-based exclusion is therefore the problem to be tackled if the government is to be
successful in eliminating poverty and social exclusion.
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The research presented here reinforces those conclusions and provides a more detailed analysis of where
markets are failing low-income households. We have examined four key questions:
To what extent have free, competitive markets been introduced in each sector?
Have the theoretical benefits of markets actually been realised?
Are these benefits limited to more affluent households who possess the skills and resources to exploit
the potential of the market?
To what extent has the market in each sector shown itself capable of (a) ensuring adequate provision for;
and (b) serving the interests of low-income consumers?
Where the theoretical benefits of markets have not been realised, we asked:
To what extent is this to the particular detriment of low-income consumers?
Are the problems evident in the functioning of the energy market symptomatic of the problems that low-
income households face in their procurement of essential services in other markets?
What mechanisms and measures have been introduced to ensure adequate provisions to low-income
consumers and how effective are these?
Who has been responsible for implementing these protective mechanisms and measures?
Are there lessons that can be learnt for the energy sector?
In seeking to answer these questions, the research has generated findings which can be grouped under five
major headings:
How effective are the markets in these sectors?
The role of regulation
How should assistance be targeted?
The consequences of not consuming, or under-consuming; and
Universal Service Obligations
The structure and operation of the market in the housing sector has little in common with any of the other
sectors and, because parallels are difficult to find, the housing sector is discussed separately. While the nature
and frequency of choice are very different to other sectors, housing does have important connections to
energy, water and financial services. Housing strongly determines energy demand and water bills, while
creditworthiness will determine if a mortgage is feasible and, if it is, what the cost will be. 
We then look at the analysis of the other six essential services to see how far the energy sector can learn from
the governance of the other sectors examined.
283
1. How effective are the markets in these sectors?
Of the seven sectors examined, only the food and drink sector comes remotely close to the neo-classical ideal
of perfect competition, with its model of large numbers of market stalls all selling identical goods at prominently
displayed prices. The home-buying and private rental parts of the housing sector, as well as the financial
services sector, are both based on competitive principles, but they have little else in common with the
theoretical ideal for market structure. Communications, energy and public transport are part monopoly (the
infrastructure networks) and part competitive markets, although, like financial services, the infrequency of
transactions, as well as other characteristics, means these markets are also far removed from the ideal. Of the
sectors examined, only water remains a fully regulated monopoly.
The act of liberalisation will not by itself result in a market that can be considered truly competitive. Markets are
only likely to be efficient if a number of rigorous conditions are met. There should be a large number of
competing companies; new companies should be able to easily enter to enhance competition and, where
companies run into difficulties, they should be allowed to fail, meaning that companies cannot rely on a bail-out
if they prove uncompetitive. In a perfect market, supplier reputation and product differentiation should play no
part in consumer choice.
1.1 Is there a competitive field of companies and are barriers to entry low?
Of the five sectors5 other than housing (described separately) and water (still a regulated monopoly), a strong
argument can be made that only for most financial services is there a large enough competitive field of
companies. Foreign companies entering, and mutual companies demutualising and expanding their scope,
have provided competition to the sometimes limited number of long-established companies. In some respects,
regulatory requirements that force new companies to demonstrate their financial strength do make it more
difficult for new companies to enter. However, in other respects these requirements give assurance that any
company from which consumers buy financial services has met strong requirements from the regulator, which
may make consumers more willing to switch to a new company. In reducing the significance that reputation
plays in consumer choice, the barriers to entry are also reduced. But this review shows that in the case of
services focussed on low income consumers, such as the Home Credit market, the relationship between
consumer and provider is a very personal one, somewhat removed from the choice and competition model and
hence, as the Competition Commission found, prone to monopolistic practices of a highly localised nature.
‘Free exit’ is notably absent in the banking sector, as was demonstrated by the rescue of Northern Rock in
2007 and the role of the financial authorities, including the Financial Services Authority, in organising
emergency funds for Bradford & Bingley in July 2008.
Energy, the retail of food and drink and public transport are dominated by a handful of companies while, in the
household landline telecoms market, the former monopoly incumbent, BT, is still dominant. In energy, there are
six large companies that control the retail markets for electricity and gas, that are of comparable size in the UK
market (four are subsidiaries of much larger foreign companies). The design of the wholesale markets for
energy and the fact that, for electricity, the producers are the same companies as the retailers makes scale
entry implausible other than by takeover of existing companies, most likely by one of the already established
companies, a situation that erodes rather than stimulates competitive benefit. This vertical integration is in
contrast to the food sector where the retail market is similarly concentrated but the retailers are not integrated
back into food production. For the consumer, this means that the food retailers can place heavy pressure on
their suppliers and some of the cost reductions may be passed on to consumers. For the electricity sector, the
vertically integrated retail companies have little incentive to drive down wholesale prices because if these
reductions are passed on to consumers, they will tend to reduce the profits of their generation divisions.6
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For food, there are very large numbers of small stores, but the big four supermarket chains have such a high
market share and such strong buying power, that it is difficult to imagine new entrants easily rivalling these four.
While the takeover by Co-op of Somerfield - each with about 4 per cent of the market - does introduce a
potential fifth player, it leaves the next largest company with less than 3 per cent of the market.7 Nevertheless,
the response to the economic problems of 2008 and the loss of market share experienced by high-priced
stores, e.g. Marks & Spencer, at the same time as low-priced stores such as Lidl and Aldi have experienced
increases in market share, does suggest that the balance of power in the market is not entirely fixed.
Public transport has also seen a remarkable process of concentration with a handful of UK-based companies
now dominating rail franchises and bus markets. Clearly, the rail sector does not have free entry and exit. A
vision of ‘merchant’ bus services was prominent when bus services were opened up in the 1980s, whereby
small entrepreneurial companies identified attractive routes and competed for business against existing
companies by offering better services or lower prices. In theory, passengers could literally choose at the bus
stop which company to travel with. In practice, this sort of intense competition was short-lived, with new entrant
companies either failing, or being swallowed up by the larger players. This policy was abandoned only ten
years after it was introduced in order to allow a more planned approach that would allow policy aims, for
example environmental and social objectives, to be more easily met.
For telecoms, the market dominance of BT is slowly being eroded. The emergence of broadband services as a
large market has facilitated the entry of a significant number of new companies in offering ‘bundles’ of services
including landline and mobiles. Whether BT’s ownership of the landline network is an obstacle to competition is
debateable. For mobile phones, there are five networks owned by the five major competing companies. This
means that, despite the plethora of deals (which can be impenetrable to consumers) and the large number of
brand names, competition is actually less intense than it appears to be. That said, there does appear to be
some scope for new entry.
1.2 Alternatives to mainstream market provision
In some sectors, non-mainstream provision is making a useful, albeit generally limited, contribution to low-
income households. For financial services, credit unions provide an important service to low-income
households, while community transport provides valuable transport assistance at the local level. Farmers’
markets can also be seen as an alternative to mainstream provision, although a primary driver in setting these
up has been the desire of producers to increase margins by cutting out retailers. 
Both the ethos and the ownership and governance structure of these alternative approaches to provision,
whether they be charities, social enterprises, mutually owned or community interest companies, will mean that
the motive to earn a profit may be balanced against other guiding objectives. Such initiatives seem most likely
to be successful where distinctive products or services of particular value to low-income consumers can be
offered that address the reluctance of providers in the mainstream market to cater to this group. For standard,
essential products like energy and water and where scale economies in production are large, the prospects for
non-mainstream provision seem less promising within the current market framework, at least until new
technologies, such as community level or micro-generation (under which communities and/or households
generate some or all of their heating and energy needs) become more viable.
1.3 Are the costs of switching borne by consumers?
For the public transport and food and drink sector, switching from one supplier to another (where possible with
public transport) does not, by itself, create any additional costs other than the search costs that a switch might
incur. The customer simply chooses a different supplier at the point of purchase. However, for the energy,
telecoms and financial services sectors, there are significant costs associated with consumers switching
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supplier. These costs are inevitably passed on in some way to consumers and any benefits of competition must
be off-set against these additional costs.
For energy, a switch involves re-registering the consumer’s unique meter details with the new supplier. This
would seem to be a simple process but, when competition in electricity was introduced in 1998 for household
consumers, the cost of building and running the switching systems over an eight year period was close to
£1bn, or about £5 per household per year. 
The cost per switch should be relatively low if things go smoothly, but very high if not, as it involves large
amounts of time by company staff trying to reconcile registration details. There is no recent authoritative
estimate of the average switching cost but, in 1999, MacLaine estimated it to be about £50 per consumer.8 If 20
per cent of consumers switch per year, this imposes an additional cost of £250 million for electricity alone. By
law, companies are not allowed to charge an individual consumer for switching. This therefore institutionalises
a cross subsidy from non-switchers to switchers, and even if companies were able to charge for a switch, the
charge would deter consumers from switching, so they would be unlikely to make a charge. There is also no
opportunity to recover these initial costs in higher charges in subsequent years as sometimes happens, for
example, in the insurance sector – consumers are offered a low insurance premium in the first year, but the
cost of this is recovered with higher premiums in subsequent years.
Intuitively, it might be expected that switching telecoms supplier would involve similar costs to switching energy
supplier because they both basically require the transfer of a unique number between providers. While there is
no information on the extent of these costs, the process does seem smoother than switching energy supplier.
For financial services, the checks and registration of details required for an insurance policy or a bank account
are extensive. It is not clear what the scale of the costs is, or how the companies recover them, for example is
this achieved by spreading them over all their consumers or by increased charges in subsequent years?
1.4 How easy is it to compare suppliers?
One of the major innovations in consumer purchasing has been the use of the internet to research and buy
products and services. Price comparison sites allow consumers to compare a range of offers. Of the sectors
we examine, price comparison sites are particularly important for financial services, communications and
energy. Indeed, many people are now reliant on these sites to aid and inform their purchases. However, there
are issues that need to be kept in mind. The sites must be independent and must offer impartial advice if they
are to be credible and of real value to consumers. For the sites that offer energy price comparisons,
energywatch reviewed its ‘Confidence Code’9 in April 2008 to which price comparison sites must adhere if they
are to remain accredited by energywatch.
However, from a social equity point of view, the serious issue for low-income households is that many do not
have ready access to computers and broadband connections, without which using price comparison sites is
very difficult. As the Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks, told the Business & Enterprise Committee:10
A final point - and I think this is the most important point - is that those who are more confident about
switching as a key solution here are people who take for granted that everyone has access to a flat-
screen computer, can go to the different sites and get the best deal, and has the wherewithal to then
revisit and re-switch in x months' time. You know as well as I do that many of our constituents are
nowhere near a computer and have so many issues on their mind that they are not readily able to
make use of switching. Indeed, I was looking at survey evidence this morning and the evidence I am
shown is, not surprisingly, that many of the most vulnerable, in the lower income groups, are the least
likely to have switched. I do not want as an egalitarian switching to depend on the wherewithal and
the access to technologies which our constituents do not have.
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The model of a competitive and efficient market relies on consumers making choices and switching where an
economic advantage can be gained. However, experience in the energy market clearly shows that even with
what should be a relatively straightforward choice, a significant proportion of consumers that switch do not
achieve what they were setting out to do, which is to save money. For financial services, the consequences of
making a bad choice, for example, on a pension plan, could be very long-lasting and financially serious.
Consumers also have a range of criteria other than the simple price criterion when they make choices. This
reduces the cost pressure on companies who can use, for example, customer loyalty and brand reputation to
retain their customers, even when their prices are not competitive. The result is that the theoretical
requirements for an ‘efficient’ market are not met. ‘Switch-averse’ consumers, who choose to stay with a
product they have experience with and with a provider they trust, may be making a completely rational and
sensible decision according to their own priorities, while appearing ‘irrational’ in terms of economic theory.
Equally, choosing an expensive pay-as-you go mobile phone or a pre-payment energy meter may also be a
rational choice for someone living on a very limited budget who needs to keep expenditure under tight control.
2. The role of regulation
In five of the seven sectors (energy, telecoms, water, rail and financial services), an independent regulator has
been created in the past 20 years with responsibilities for overseeing markets. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
and the Competition Commission have responsibilities across all sectors for monitoring markets (see Table 1).
Most of these - Ofgem, OFT, Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), and the Food Standards Agency - are ‘Non-
Ministerial Government Departments’ (NMGDs). Ofcom is a Public Corporation, while the Competition
Commission is a Non-Department Public Body (NDPB).11 The Financial Services Authority is a special case
because it is a limited company, but it exercises statutory powers and is treated for many purposes as part of
government.
For housing, the regulatory system is in transition. The Housing Corporation is being replaced by the Homes
and Communities Agency and a regulatory body, provisionally called Oftenant, which will take over and expand
the Housing Corporation’s regulatory role, giving greater scope for tenants of social housing to require their
landlords to give good service.
For these purposes, the distinction between the statuses of these bodies is of limited interest, but they have a
number of features in common. They are not headed by government ministers, but were established by Act of
Parliament and have statutory duties. They are accountable only to Parliament and the courts.
The role of the energy and financial services regulators has been brought into sharp focus by fast rising energy
prices and failings at the Financial Services Authority in relation to the demise of Northern Rock. The GMB
Union have even called for the abolition of Ofgem:12
GMB want to see Ofgem abolished and the government taking over the regulatory role itself and be
answerable to parliament for this and we will continue to campaign for this.
The main issues raised by the reliance on regulators are: political independence, and accountability and
representativeness.
2.1 Political independence
The rationale behind these bodies is that they should be able to make politically independent decisions. This
has an intuitively appealing logic: the bodies should make quasi-judicial judgements that should not be
influenced by party political considerations. For example, this would seem to make it easier for them to make
judgements for the good of consumers that might show the government in a bad light or highlight the failings of
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government policy. Government has made attempts to give greater independence to regulatory bodies in
recent years, for example the Monetary Policy Committee is able to decide on the Bank of England base
interest rate independently of government. The Competition Commission, whose remit had been limited to
making recommendations to ministers, now has independent powers to enforce remedial actions on companies
in many cases.
Whether this political independence is as real as it is portrayed to be is questionable. The decision-makers in
these bodies are appointed by government ministers, with whom the bodies frequently share their statutory
duties. For example, all the duties of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority are jointly held with the Minister.
The Minister is also able, albeit in restricted circumstances, to sack the regulators and override decisions using
reserve powers in some instances.
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Table 1 Regulatory bodies
Sector Regulatory body Primary duties Areas of responsibility
Energy Gas & electricity
markets authority
To protect the interests of consumers
through the promotion of
competition, wherever appropriate.
Set prices for monopoly services,
monitor quality, oversee markets.
Water Water Services
Regulatory Authority
To enable efficient companies to
finance and carry out their duties
while ensuring that consumers have
access to water (and waste water
services) at a fair price and with a
high standard of service.
Set prices for monopoly services,
monitor quality.
Telecoms Ofcom To further the interests of citizens in
relation to communications matters;
and to further the interests of
consumers in relevant markets,
where appropriate, by promoting
competition.
A broad range of responsibilities in
telecoms, broadcasting, setting and
enforcing rules on fair competition
between companies in these
industries.
Financial services Financial Services
Authority
Maintaining confidence in the
financial system; promoting public
understanding of the financial
system; securing the appropriate
degree of protection for consumers;
reduction of financial crime.
Wide range of activities, including
monitoring the policies of banks to
ensure their financial integrity.
Rail Office of Rail
Regulation
Department for
Transport
Setting framework under which the
infrastructure provider works; the
stewardship of the railway
infrastructure; determining the
efficient allocation of access to
railway facilities.
To regulate Network Rail’s
stewardship of the national rail
network; licensing the operators of
railway assets, approval of
agreements for access by operators
to track, stations, etc, and
enforcement of domestic competition
law.
Government is in charge of setting the
strategy for the railways including the
level of public expenditure & key
outputs to be delivered; the devolved
governments in Scotland and Wales
and regional and local funders would
have an increased role in specifying
and funding services.
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Food & drink Food Standards
Agency
To protect the health of the
public and the interests of
consumers, in relation to
food.
Housing Housing Corporation Currently being replaced by two
agencies, the Homes and
Communities Agency and a regulatory
body, provisionally called Oftenant,
which will take over and expand the
Housing Corporation’s regulatory role,
giving greater scope for tenants of
social housing to require their
landlords to give good service.
All (although powers and
responsibilities are often
delegated to sector
regulators)
Office of Fair Trading
Competition
Commission
To make markets work well
for consumers.
Conducting in-depth
inquiries into mergers,
markets and the regulation
of the major regulated
industries.
Gathering intelligence about markets
and trader behaviour and responding
to ‘super-complaints’ about markets
(other than ones where the sector
regulator responds) from designated
consumer bodies (e.g. National
Consumer Council). Where potential
problems are identified, OFT
undertakes market studies and
recommends or takes further action
where needed (e.g. referral to the
Competition Commission).
Investigations in three areas: in
mergers - when larger companies will
gain more than 25% market share
and where a merger appears likely to
lead to a substantial lessening of
competition in one or more markets in
the UK; in markets - when it appears
that competition may be being
prevented, distorted or restricted in a
particular market; in regulated sectors
where aspects of the regulatory
system may not be operating
effectively or to address certain
categories of dispute between
regulators and regulated companies.
Inquiries are undertaken in response
to a reference made to it by another
authority, usually the Office of Fair
Trading. It has no power to conduct
inquiries on its own initiative.
Source: Various
At times when issues relating to the above sectors are away from the headlines, governments are generally
happy to be absolved from responsibility for making decisions that might prove unpopular. But when things go
seriously wrong, as for example happened in 2001 with the rail industry, the government quickly moves in to
take control. The first rail regulatory body, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, was abolished and partly
replaced by the Strategic Rail Authority (NDPB) in 2001, which itself was abolished only three years later when
its functions were taken over by the government through the Department for Transport. The Rail Regulator was
replaced in 2004 by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) with much more restricted powers.
2.2 Accountability and representativeness
While the regulatory bodies are in law accountable to Parliament, the way in which this happens is far from
clear. They are obliged to present annual reports featuring accounts signed off by the National Audit Office and
Parliament, but there is no systematic process that then ensures Parliamentary interrogation of these. Given
that these regulatory bodies account for the expenditure of a significant amount of public money, this seems a
major omission. Select Committees scrutinise activities of these bodies on an ad hoc basis and have the power
to examine them on specific issues as, for example, the Business & Enterprise Committee did in its Inquiry into
energy markets in 2008.13 The National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee can also carry out one-
off investigations but also do not routinely assess ‘value for money’.
The tacit assumption that there is a range of political decisions that are the responsibility of government to
make (e.g. what is generally thought of as ‘energy policy’), while there are others, which are essentially ‘value-
free’ (e.g. what is generally known as economic regulation), that can be taken by apolitical bodies is also
questionable.
For governments, it may be convenient to shelter behind regulatory bodies where politically contentious
decisions are needed, for example decisions that lead to increased prices. 
The same ambiguity about where political decision-making starts and economic regulation ends seems to exist
within the housing market and decision-making on social issues related to housing are partly with national and
local government, but also with unelected and weakly accountable regulatory bodies.
This weak accountability would seem to require that there was a particular onus on government to make these
bodies at least in some sense representative of the public that they act for. But there seems to be a tacit
assumption that decisions are technical ones and, for example, economic regulation needs to be carried out by
those with business or governmental backgrounds. 
3. How should assistance be targeted?
Of the seven sectors studied, water, energy, transport and housing have varying schemes, mostly funded by
taxpayers, aimed at providing support to low-income consumers (see Table 2). Arguably and not by
coincidence, these are the sectors where general indicators of poverty do not always provide a reliable
indication of whether low-income households will have difficulty affording their needs. All things being equal, it
is clear that money in these schemes should be targeted at those consumers facing the greatest difficulties to
ensure that the maximum benefit is derived from the resources. However, the problems with accurately
identifying the consumers facing greatest difficulty have meant that, in some cases, a very broad untargeted
approach is used, for example bus passes and winter fuel allowances for those over a certain age.
290
291
Table 2 Current assistance mechanisms for low-income households
Government subsidy or
support mechanism
Mandatory company
assistance
Industry voluntary
assistance
3rd sector/non-
mainstream
Energy Winter Fuel Payment,
Cold Weather Payments
Fuel Direct
Warm Front in England
and its devolved
equivalents.
CERT Limited social initiatives
such as socially oriented
tariffs and trust funds.
Telecoms - BT Universal Service
Obligation (and
Kingston
Communications in Hull
and East Yorkshire area
USO).
BT pre-pay scheme
Pay& Call.
Water - Vulnerable Groups
scheme (WaterSure)
1999 ban on
disconnections and pre-
payment meters.
Charitable schemes set
up by companies.
Food & drink Mother and baby
vouchers.
Sure Start education for
mothers.
School meals subsidies.
Meals-on-wheels
support.
None Supermarket food banks
for short-dated products.
Community gardens,
box schemes, cafes,
food banks.
Soup kitchens.
Housing Rent controls in social
sector
Housing benefit
Income Support for
Mortgage Interest
Improvement grants and
loans
Council tax benefit.
Housing associations.
Public transport Bus/train ticket
concession. Rail
subsidies for essential
services.
Community transport.
Financial
services
Post Office Card
Account; Social Fund;
Child Trust Fund;
Growth Fund; Social
Inclusion Fund.
Basic bank accounts. Credit unions
Commercial
development financial
institutions.
3.1 Pros and cons of the untargeted approach
Clearly, the winter fuel allowance and the bus passes for those over 60 do lead to a large amount of money
being given to people who, by any standards, do not need this support. The government’s Fuel Poverty Action
Group (FPAG) in England, which monitors the effectiveness of government policies on fuel poverty, argues
strongly that the money spent on Winter Fuel Allowances would achieve much greater benefits if targeted at
those most in need, as those below pension age receive nothing no matter how dire their circumstances. FPAG
also argues the money should be directed mostly towards capital expenditure on energy efficiency. This has
the potential to permanently lift families out of fuel poverty, by reducing the amount of energy they need for a
given energy service, whereas simply subsidising bills will be a recurrent item. Reducing energy demand would
also tend to have environmental benefits. In its 2007 Annual Report, FPAG recommends:14
Warm Front annual expenditure should, in the 2008-11 period, be restored at least to its 2007-2008
level of £350m. This could easily be done if Government expenditure were better targeted, e.g. by
discontinuing Winter Fuel Payments for higher rate tax payers, which would free up over £200m pa for
Warm Front.
However, such untargeted schemes are relatively straightforward to administer and their universal nature may
be politically attractive. In addition, arguably, the consequences of someone who should receive support but
who is not receiving it are much more serious than those of giving money to groups that do not need it. Put
another way, ‘errors of inclusion’ are less serious than ‘errors of exclusion’. But this argument effectively
ignores the opportunity costs of the resources used.
Support mechanisms for low-income households for water are widely seen as very weak and few households
are able to take advantage of even the low level of support offered.
The case for bus passes is also somewhat different as these may make a bus service defensible that would
otherwise not be viable, resulting in benefits for all citizens in the area. Clearly for energy, there is no
substantial issue of non-viability of existing services, although not all consumers have access to a mains gas
service.
3.2 Problems with targeting
3.2.1 Groups with lowest incomes are sometimes not those in most need
For some of the sectors studied, e.g. food and drink, income would seem a good proxy for need because it is
not distorted by other factors, such as the quality of housing. However, for energy and housing, and to a lesser
extent water and public transport, this may not always be so. This means that targeting assistance at those
most in need needs a specific determination of the individual’s circumstances.
The way in which water is charged for many consumers, based on the size and value of the property and not
volume of water usage, may also mean income is not a good proxy for need. But neither is volume consumed,
as that will reflect such issues as family size, medical conditions and even employment. As with energy, the
efficiency of equipment strongly influences demand and it is often possible to significantly reduce demand
without altering the quality of service received. For example, an energy-efficient fridge can keep its contents as
cold as an energy-inefficient fridge, but the energy consumption required to achieve this will be noticeably
lower with the former than with the latter. For transport, the required expenditure to meet reasonable need will
vary according to the geographic location of the household in relation to workplace, shops, schools and other
services. It will also vary with the level of fares charged by the local transport provider, which can vary widely.
Private transport is an alternative way to meet this need but, in some circumstances, might be the cheapest
option.
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These issues surrounding housing are taken up in more detail in section 5.
3.2.2 Low take-up of many benefits
If the social security system was well-designed, the amount of benefits paid out in Income Support should be a
good indicator of how much support might be needed except, as noted above, for energy and, to a lesser
extent, water for which the cost of the service is largely determined by the housing. However, the take-up rate
for means tested benefits is often low, and it cannot always be assumed that the receipt of certain benefits is
always a reliable indicator of need. Indeed, if a household does not take up a benefit to which it is entitled (for
whatever reason), this could represent the difference between being able to afford adequate provision and not
being able to.
4. Consequences of under-consuming or not consuming
While it is widely acknowledged that all the sectors studied represent essential purchases, for all except food,
there is the possibility of surviving without having access to the product or service, albeit in a highly
disadvantaged condition. Perhaps the extreme case would be homelessness, which would also be likely to
entail not having access to a personal water supply and a personal energy supply. It would also almost
inevitably be associated with not having access to a personal telecoms service and most financial services.
While homelessness is conspicuous and tends to give rise to public concern, other forms of not consuming,
while less obvious, still have the potential to be seriously detrimental. For energy, there is the possibility of
disconnection for non-payment of bills, albeit only after some safeguarding procedures have been completed.
However, the circumstances of some pre-payment meter users may lead them to initiate their own
disconnection and there is presently no safety net to prevent this, nor is there even any way to monitor the
extent to which this behaviour is occurring.
For water, disconnection for non-payment of bills is illegal but companies still threaten consumers that have not
paid their bills with disconnection.
For telecoms, landlines and mobiles, the procedures for disconnecting are in almost all cases not onerous and
a consumer that is disconnected will find it expensive to re-connect. Financial services is a more diverse sector
and not having a bank account is a very different position to be in to not having adequate insurance for
housing or vehicles. Financial services consumers’ reluctance to buy may be well founded and ‘economically
rational’, given the high risk of a bad decision in a complex transaction involving large sums of money.
Under-consumption is a much more difficult issue to address. Determining where households are using less of
a service than would be desirable for health and social inclusion reasons is often impossible. Households on
limited budgets can economise on all of these services. They could:
Eat cheap but non-nutritious foods;
Not heating or lighting their dwelling to an adequate level;
Live in non-decent housing;
Lose contact with friends and relatives if they do not travel or use a telephone; and 
Risk serious financial losses if they do not insure their possessions adequately.
Only un-metered water users do not face self-imposed pressure to economise on use of these essential
services when faced with budgetary pressures.
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5. Universal Service Obligations
European Union attempts to liberalise services, such as energy and telecoms, have been accompanied by
provisions to try to ensure that the desirable characteristics of a public service are not lost by transforming the
service from a monopoly to a market. Of particular importance is the Universal Service Obligation (USO)
imposed on Member States by the European Union on electricity, telecoms (landlines) and post. A USO
requires that member states must ensure that such services ‘are made available to all users in their territory,
regardless of their geographical location, at a specified quality level and an affordable price’.
As shown in the telecoms chapter, these arrangements are clearly in place, although they remain somewhat
problematic. For electricity, Ofgem believes that the obligation on retail suppliers to offer terms with a wide
range of payment options to anyone that applies fulfils the UK’s duties under USO requirements. In practice,
the requirement to offer terms does not prevent a retail supplier effectively blocking an application by a
consumer. Suppliers are able to ask consumers for a security deposit unless the consumer is paying through a
prepayment meter (PPM). The only limitation on this is that the ‘Security Deposit must not exceed a reasonable
amount’. In practice, security deposits are not much used,15 and deposit levels seem low. Consumers who
believe that an unreasonable deposit is being asked for were able to appeal to Ofgem, but this provision was
rarely used and, in the Supply License Review,16 Ofgem removed the right of appeal. It also removed the duty
on suppliers with fewer than 50,000 consumers to offer a range of payment methods.
However, the availability of PPMs means that retail companies have the ability to channel consumers that they
might otherwise be reluctant to supply into this option. PPMs involve little or no commercial risk for the supplier
who is guaranteed to be paid in advance for energy consumed. Whether the very large premium PPM
consumers pay compared to the cheapest option (on-line accounts with direct debits) – on average they pay 25
per cent more – is compatible with the duty to ensure the service is ‘affordable’ is a moot point.
6. Housing
Whilst it is clear that house purchase and private rental is mostly carried out through some form of market, the
structure and operation of this market has almost nothing in common with the markets for the other six sectors.
It is also distinct from the other six sectors, in being the only one where the market is over-ridden so fully. This
is partly through the provision of social housing and rent determinations and partly through the very extensive
and complex housing benefits regime. Nevertheless, the connections between the housing sector and energy,
water and financial services are strong and there are important lessons to learn.
6.1 General indicators of poverty are not reliable for housing and energy need
Housing decisions are ‘lumpy’; in other words, they are taken infrequently and involve large sums of money,
and they are much more lumpy than even energy, telecoms or financial services decisions. These services
involve individual decisions which result in a commitment to paying sums in the order of hundreds of pounds
for a year or more. This contrasts with ‘switching’ in the housing sector - i.e. moving house - which involves
huge disruption and has major financial consequences. For a significant number of households, switching
might not even be a feasible option, for example if the costs associated with buying and selling a property are
prohibitive, or for those in social housing seeking different accommodation in an area with long waiting lists.
By contrast with energy, telecoms and financial services, the cost of switching in the housing sector - removals,
legal fees etc. - falls directly on the switcher rather than being distributed amongst all users, as in the other
cases. The market search cost is also likely to be much higher.
However, despite these significant differences, there is perhaps a parallel with energy in the sense that
indicators of poverty based on income are not always a reliable indicator either of ‘fuel poverty’ or of
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households that have most difficulty affording their housing; for example, a key worker living in London would
find it much more difficult to afford adequate housing than they would if they lived in an area with lower housing
costs. This is in contrast to food, communications and financial services where general indicators of poverty
correlate reasonably well with the difficulty households will have in meeting need. For water and public
transport, required expenditure may vary widely according to the situation of the household. While this issue
does not relate directly to how well markets are serving low-income consumers, it is of central relevance when
considering what measures might be appropriate to deal with market failures and how these can be best
targeted.
In the case of energy, there is not always a clear overlap between poverty in general and ‘fuel poverty’, and
someone with a relatively high income might suffer from fuel poverty if they live in a poorly insulated house.
Equally, it is feasible that someone with a low income might have less difficulty paying energy bills if they live in
an energy efficient home, although the magnitude of price rises in recent years will have made the level of
energy efficiency required to achieve this situation much more challenging.
However, while required housing expenditure is relatively difficult to change and would generally require the
household to move to lower cost accommodation, carrying out energy efficiency measures should cause
relatively little disruption and could offer a long-term solution to the problem of fuel poverty by reducing energy
need sufficiently to lift the household out of that condition.
6.2 Energy service companies
Many observers,17 ranging from Ofgem18 to the Greater London Authority19 have advocated that we should
move away from an energy retail market that sees gas and electricity suppliers compete to sell units of energy,
towards a market in which Energy Service Companies (ESCos) compete to deliver a comprehensive energy
service. The government defines an ESCo as:
A company that provides a customer with energy supply solutions (such as heating and lighting) rather
than simply gas and electricity. An ESCo could provide a customer with a combination of energy-
saving advice and equipment, renewable generation, planned maintenance, fuel and finance. 20
This would see suppliers move away from a business model based on selling units of gas and electricity, to
one where the meeting the service need (the supply of energy as an outcome,21 i.e. heat and power, rather
than outputs, typically gas and electricity) of the consumer would be the primary driver. This would be achieved
through a programme that included energy efficiency measures to improve the fabric of the dwelling, the
installation of efficient appliances, and of which the supply of units of energy would be just one part. ESCOs
would, in theory, exhibit a financial indifference towards how the service need was met, because provision of
energy efficiency programmes would be as profitable to them as selling energy is today. The cost of energy
efficiency improvements would be recovered from consumers over an extended period. Because the service
need was being met, the consumer would be equally indifferent as to whether their energy bill paid for units of
energy, or whether it paid for energy efficiency measures, provided the overall bill was no higher. If higher
standards of comfort resulted or bills were actually reduced, consumers would receive a net benefit. 
For a variety of reasons, there is little sign of this objective being met. One of the main problems is that a
company would have no incentive to carry out energy efficiency measures unless it was sure of recovering its
costs. This might be through locking the consumer’s energy supply in on a long-term contract, which defeats
the purpose of retail competition; or through other, perhaps more damaging, ways of recouping the money
such as debt recovery mechanisms. 
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Energy supply companies are currently required to deliver energy efficiency measures to consumers through
the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT ) obligation, and it is estimated that this costs a consumer with
both a gas and electricity supply around £38 per annum.22 CERT requires suppliers to achieve a specified level
of carbon savings through a pre-approved range of measures/approaches. However, the level of investment,
estimated at £2.8bn over three years, is determined by the target level of carbon savings, rather than by
market needs. Although 40 per cent of carbon savings have to be achieved within the ‘Priority Group’, this
element of the scheme is not specifically a fuel poverty programme; and the resultant level of investment
(around £370m per annum) will not upgrade the housing stock sufficiently to make a large impression on the
level of fuel poverty. If the energy service company model was to take off, the amount spent on energy
efficiency would be determined by how much was economically justified. There must be a strong suspicion that
this would have been far more than is paid for by the CERT scheme and its predecessors, especially with
current energy prices. Such a model would also have produced substantial ‘free’ benefits for the housing
sector.
Overall, an efficient ESCo market, provided it did not have the same in-built biases again low-income
households that the current market has, is an intriguing and attractive way to deal with the problem of under-
investment in energy efficiency measures. However, a large scale ESCo market is still a long way off and the
role that nascent ESCOs can play in dealing with the current problems appears to be very limited. 
6.3 Non-mainstream provision
The provision of social housing, increasingly the responsibility of housing associations rather than elected
councils, does offer parallels with developments in the financial services and local public transport sectors
where non-mainstream options - primarily credit unions and community transport - are being encouraged to fill
the gaps left by the market and ensure provision to low-income groups.
7. Lessons for energy from other sectors
There are seven main areas where a comparison between energy and the other sectors examined provides
interesting lessons for energy, particularly in how well markets serve low-income households:
1. The concentrated market structure;
2. The social issues raised by pre-payment meters and price differentials;
3. The role of the regulator;
4. The division of responsibilities between regulator and government;
5. Non-mainstream provision;
6. Dealing with sector poverty; and
7. Market solutions.
7.1 The concentrated market structure
It is open to question whether the fragmented market structure that market theory relies upon for efficient
markets was feasible or even desirable for the energy industry. It is clear that the gas and electricity industries
are now oligopolies composed of only a handful of companies. There is little likelihood of new entry and every
chance that further mergers and takeovers will reduce the field of competing companies even more. The
decision in 1998 to allow corporate integration of electricity generation and retail of gas and electricity (by
electricity generators taking over retailers) made it almost inevitable that wholesale electricity markets would
remain illiquid. It also made entry barriers for both generation and retail almost insurmountable. 
The regulator and government has raised little or no objection to the mergers and takeovers that followed the
1998 decision, and any moves now to reduce the market power of the mainly foreign-owned companies would
be hugely politically contentious.
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It is difficult to draw comparisons with the other utility sectors. Water remains a regulated monopoly, while rail
can never, for practical reasons, be a free market with easy entry and exit. The attempt to create a free market
in buses was abandoned for a more planned approach after a decade of experience, which demonstrated that
a free market would not deliver important social and environmental objectives for this sector. Whether a market
is able to deliver the important social and environmental objectives that exist for energy, particularly reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases, remains to be seen.
Telecoms remains concentrated with BT retaining a dominant market share in the household landline market,
but it has been possible to gain new entry and the likelihood is that the telecoms landline market will become
less concentrated. In part, this new entry has been possible due to the fortuitous introduction of broadband
services, which allowed a new set of companies into the market who could bundle telecoms with broadband
and television services. It is also due to the fact that a company offering telecoms services to final consumers
does not have to undertake massive upfront expenditure or credit risk on the scale of, for example, building a
new power station or signing a long-term contract for wholesale supply of gas.
7.2 The social issues raised by pre-payment meters and price differentials
Pre-payment meters for electricity and later gas were introduced on a large scale from 1992 onwards. Their
introduction seems to have had more to do with political and corporate expediency – reducing the number of
formal disconnections – than with any social welfare issues. The contrast with water is stark, where
disconnections were quickly made illegal and pre-payment meters banned when it became clear that these
measures were likely to cause serious hardship as well as having public health consequences. It is far from
clear why government believed these measures were needed for water, but not for energy.
Pay-as-you-go mobile phones and, to a much lesser extent, pre-payment meters are popular with many of the
consumers that use them because of the budgetary control they give. Consumers know they are not using any
more energy or ‘phone time than they can afford.
However, they raise two serious social welfare issues:
They mask problems of affordability: instead of consumers who cannot afford their bills having
disconnection enforced by their supplier, consumers initiate their ‘self’ disconnection. The disconnection
rate would be a very useful indicator of the real affordability of energy supplies, were it not for the fact
that it is currently near- impossible to estimate accurately the extent of self-disconnection;
In a competitive market, they clearly identify consumers who have difficulty paying their bill. Competing
companies may assume that these consumers are not as desirable as more affluent consumers, or they
may believe that PPM users will be less price sensitive than other consumers because they are more
likely to lack the skills and means to exploit the market, or they are blocked from switching because of
debt. If the barriers to entry were not so high, it might be plausible that new niche companies would
come in targeting PPM consumers in the way that there are companies that target pay-as-you go mobile
phones and financial services companies that specialise in serving consumers with poor credit records.
It is interesting to contrast the government’s and the energy regulator’s defence of energy PPMs and
disconnections with the government’s attitude to water PPMs and disconnections. In water, disconnections and
PPMs were quickly banned after they began to occur on a large scale. The large differentials between PPM
and other methods of payment for energy have existed since the introduction of retail competition, but the
regulator has showed little sign of concern until political pressures forced its hand in 2008, ten years after retail
competition was introduced.
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Before retail energy competition was introduced, the regulator required that the differential between PPM tariffs
and standard credit tariffs should not exceed 5 per cent. At that time, direct debit use was much less common
and on-line management of accounts was not available. These price controls proved effective in preventing
PPM consumers paying disproportionately more for their energy. For water, the approach with metering cost is
somewhat different but is still designed to ensure companies do not exploit a particular class of consumer. The
water regulator requires that those whose consumption is metered should pay no more than the actual
additional cost.
While the differential between PPM and other forms of payment has long existed, the biggest price differential
is now between on-line direct debit and all other forms of payment. On average, on-line direct debit is about 20
per cent cheaper than either PPM or standard credit and is cheaper even than conventional direct debit. The
reason for these differentials seems to stem from corporate priorities and, in part, reflects the inertia that is
created by the difficulties that PPM and some standard credit customers face in switching to cheaper tariffs.
7.3 The role of the regulator
When the policy of privatising and introducing competition to public utilities, including telecoms, gas, water,
electricity and rail, was introduced, the role of the regulator was ill-defined. Government rhetoric suggested that
consumers could rely on markets and that the regulator would be no more than a ‘backstop’. This left
consumers with little idea as to what they could expect from the regulator, or of where they stood in relation to
the regulator. The architect of much of the regulatory regime and the electricity regulator for the first 10 years,
Professor Stephen Littlechild, summed up the regulator’s role as ‘holding the fort until competition arrived’.23
Reflecting this limited short term role, staffing levels were low. For example, Ofgem’s predecessor on the gas
side, Ofgas, started work with a staff of 21 and the gas regulator suggested that this number would need to
grow to only around 30 for regulation to be effective.
This vision quickly proved to be unrealistic on a number of grounds:
Markets remained highly concentrated, generally oligopolies of no more than a handful of companies,
meaning markets could not be left to operate without close regulatory supervision;
The suggestion that markets would find ways to make even apparently permanent monopolies subject to
competitive forces proved over-optimistic and regulators were required to continue setting monopoly
prices using ever more elaborate, expensive and time-consuming methods;
The companies have too frequently been found to be operating unfair practices. Regulators therefore
need to monitor activities and check the information they are given by the companies. For example,
electricity generators have continually been suspected of manipulating the wholesale market,24 energy
retailers have been guilty of mis-selling practices and water companies have misled the water regulator
on leakage rates and bad debts, and have overestimated investment needs for the networks;
The companies have not always maintained the sector networks to the standard required, most clearly
for the rail network, but also the water network. With regards to the rail network, making up the deficit in
maintenance has cost rail travellers dearly in terms of higher ticket prices and delay, leaving regulators
with a major task in monitoring the condition of networks.25
Only three years after gas privatisation, electricity privatisation was accompanied with the creation of a
regulatory body staffed by about 200 employees. Expectations that this level of staffing would only be needed
in the early years while competition took hold also proved overly optimistic, with the staffing level and budget
showing little sign of reducing even 20 years after the creation of an electricity regulatory body.
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The telecoms utility sector has been the closest to the Littlechild model, with Ofcom now little involved in price-
setting although, as the report on telecoms shows, Ofcom seems much more ready than Ofgem to act pro-
actively on behalf of consumers where it suspects that the behaviour of companies is leading to consumer
detriment. How far this reduction in the role of the regulator in telecoms can be attributed to good policy, and
how far it can be attributed to very rapid technical progress, including the mass introduction of mobile phones
and massive demand increases, is a moot point. Proposals to introduce competition to water do not seem
realistic, except for perhaps the few very large users who already theoretically have some choice, and the
regulator will inevitably continue to assume a central role in the industry.
In enacting the philosophy that regulation should be a temporary and diminishing presence, sector regulators
have sought to minimise their interventions in a bid to leave competition unhindered. This has prompted
questions over the extent to which regulators have become too passive and, as a result, have neglected their
duty to protect the consumer interest. The government itself has contributed to the pressure on regulators to
minimise their impact on industry through the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) set up in 1997 and
replaced by the Better Regulation Commission (BRC) in 2005. The premise of these bodies has always been
that regulation is unnecessarily intrusive on industry and should be cut back. For example, the BRTF’s
objective was ‘to advise the Government on action to ensure that regulation and its enforcement are
proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted.’26 While the BRC’s remit is to to advise the
Government on action to: ‘reduce unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens.’27
The contrast between the complacency of Ofgem when faced with rapidly rising prices in 2008 and OFT, who
have been far more pro-active and whose threat is seen to be more credible than that of Ofgem, is particularly
stark. OFT has threatened the banks that they would face stronger regulation and a full-blown investigation if
they did not reduce their charges and make them more reflective of the costs they incurred in providing the
service to consumers.28 What was particularly telling was OFT’s concern for low-income consumers. One of its
key findings was:
First, there seems to be a substantial cross subsidisation from those consumers who incur insufficient
funds charges to those who do not; and to a significant extent from ‘vulnerable’, low income and low
saving consumers, to higher income, higher saving ones.
Indeed, the Consumer Credit Act 2006 goes considerably further than its predecessors in the scope for
enforcement by OFT, Trading Standards and the Courts. By contrast, in 2002, wholesale electricity prices
collapsed but none of this price reduction was passed on to household consumers; in 2005, retail prices rose
rapidly at a rate that did not seem to be justified by costs; in 2006, when wholesale prices fell, the reductions
were not fully passed on to consumers; and in 2008, retail prices rose rapidly again. Ofgem only seemed to
respond with the launch of its market probe after being forced to by pressure from consumer bodies and the
government and after being pre-empted by the House of Commons Business & Enterprise Committee. Despite
the large price differentials between payment methods appearing soon after retail competition was introduced a
decade ago, Ofgem is yet to carry out any in-depth investigation examining whether such differentials are
justified by additional costs.
7.4 Division of responsibilities between regulators and government
The role for independent regulators is to take decisions in consumers’ interests that do not involve political
judgement and are better taken by an ‘independent’ body not subject to political pressure. Government’s role is
to set the policy framework within which the regulatory body should work. Government makes the laws and the
regulator makes quasi-judicial rulings, setting monopoly prices and laying down the rules of competition.
In practice, it is clear that regulators are not as independent as the theory would imply, and are not immune to
political pressure. They are appointed by government and can be dismissed by government, and they share
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their duties with the government minister, so it would be difficult for a regulator to pursue a policy that is not in
agreement with or runs counter to the government. Of the sector regulators, the first regulatory body for rail
came into most overt conflict with government and inevitably, and probably rightly, given that government is the
elected representative of the public, it was government that prevailed.
The other side of the coin is the risk that for politically contentious issues where government is reluctant to get
involved, government may try to place regulatory agencies in a policy-making role. Far from interfering, the
government is abdicating its responsibility to make and enforce public policy. This is illustrated clearly with fuel
poverty where it is now clear that, despite setting itself mandatory targets on reducing fuel poverty,
government’s efforts have been inadequate. It has had some success in raising incomes but its energy
efficiency programmes, while useful, have proved far too limited. Government has relied on falls in energy
prices to reduce the number of fuel poor despite it being clear that, in the medium term, prices were bound to
rise, reflecting, for example, the need to reduce greenhouse gases and fossil fuel depletion. This has left
Ofgem to take an important role in dealing with fuel poverty in an area where its scope for action is limited. 
Of the other utility sectors, water remains a regulated monopoly, meaning the distortions that are apparent in
energy markets do not arise. However, government acted decisively to ban disconnections and pre-payment
meters for water. Communication and transport are not intrinsically linked with physical welfare in the way that
water and energy are, so the issue is primarily one of social inclusion. Each household’s need for
communications and transport is unique to their own circumstances, meaning it is much less clear where
consumers are not using these services as much as would be necessary for social inclusion
7.5 Non-mainstream provision
As argued above, the nature of energy – it is a standardised product - and its demand characteristics – it is an
essential purchase - means that non-market provision will not easily flourish, because it is difficult to produce
‘niche’ products that exploit unfulfilled demand and which do not threaten the existing companies. In some
countries, notably the USA, energy continues to be supplied by cooperatives, which originated in areas (mostly
rural) that existing suppliers saw no economic incentive to serve.29 These cooperatives remain protected
monopolies and it is difficult to see how such organisations could now emerge in the EU. Whether creative
thinking could produce new non-market ways of supplying energy is hard to determine. Woking Borough
Council has set up Thameswey Energy Ltd, a not for profit joint venture, ‘to invest in combined heat and power
plant (energy stations), to sell heat and power in an environmentally friendly way, with a view to improving the
environment within the Borough.’30 This scheme is targeted at sheltered housing residents and has been
successful in ensuring that the energy bills of all the residents represent no more than 6-7 per cent of the state
pension.
In the medium- to long-term, non-mainstream provision could become more important if some of the promising
technology options become commercial. Micro-generation options, such as wind power, solar panels, ground
source heat pumps and micro-turbines (where the central heating boiler would be replaced by a gas turbine
that would generate power as well as providing the hot water needed for space and water-heating) could allow
consumers to reduce their dependence on the commercial energy market and potentially even profit from
selling surplus power back to the grid. Local supply options, such as combined heat and power and district
heating, could also reduce households’ dependence on the national market.
7.6 Sector poverty
For some of the sectors, it is a difficult judgement whether there is specific sector poverty. Are the households
that are finding it difficult to purchase enough of the necessities struggling because of their specific needs, or
simply because their income is too low? If it is the latter, then the fundamental solution is increasing their
income.
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There are issues for low-income households in rural locations that cross a number of sectors. For example,
rural households may find it more difficult to access financial services, they may have to pay more for food and
drink because shops are either further away or not subject to the strong competitive pressure that are evident
in towns and cities. They may also have particular problems with transport because public transport services
are sparse and petrol prices are often higher than in towns and cities. For energy, the main issue for rural
consumers is whether they have access to a gas supply. As government data shows, households that do not
have a gas supply are much more likely to be fuel poor than those that do. However, it might not prove
economically feasible to provide a gas connection to many of those in a rural location who do not already have
one.
Apart from the issues outlined above for rural consumers, in telecoms, food and drink and financial services,
sector poverty is not a major factor. Therefore, probably the best way to help low income consumers would be
to increase their overall income. For transport, everyone’s needs are different depending on a number of
factors including where they live and how far they have to travel to work. Some concessions exist, notably for
pensioners, students and the unemployed, but these do not address the problems of working age families.
The issue of payment method differentials, which contributes significantly to fuel poverty, is discussed above. It
is far more pronounced than for other purchases and reducing these differentials, so that the methods of
payment used by low-income households were closer to other payment methods, would go a significant way to
assisting low-income consumers and reducing fuel poverty.
‘Housing poverty’ does arguably exist, as the affordability of housing is influenced as much by the location, size
and condition of the property as it is by disposable income. Government policy recognises this with the very
extensive and complex Housing Benefit system that directly subsidises rental costs and is, in some instances,
paid direct to the provider (landlord). Housing Benefit is unusual amongst support mechanisms for essential
services in that it will subsidise up to 100 per cent of the recipient’s ‘eligible’ rent.
‘Water poverty’ does exist to a certain extent, in part because of the arcane method of charging that exists. For
metered households, there are demand side measures that can be taken to mitigate the risk of water poverty,
for example efficient toilets, washing machines etc. to reduce demand whilst providing the same service. 
However, energy is very different from the other sectors in the extent to which there is the scope to take
demand side measures which could allow households to get the same or better energy service as they get now
but, at the same or, potentially, lower cost. Conservation is the perfect example of a win-win solution. In the
longer term, microgeneration technologies may, in conjunction with energy efficiency measures, also play an
important role in achieving this outcome. 
In part, more efficient appliances, particularly fridges, washing machines, televisions and lighting, would help.
But it is improvements to the fabric of housing that hold the most potential for reducing fuel poverty, and the
interaction between the housing sector and the energy sector is particularly important. Measures to improve the
housing stock would contribute to achieving a number of policy objectives, including improving health and
welfare, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases as well as effectively permanently reducing fuel poverty. It is
therefore all the more bewildering that the government chooses a time of rising energy prices to reduce
spending on Warm Front, its flagship energy efficiency programme in England. 
7.7 Market solutions
In the long-term, energy efficiency measures have the greatest scope for removing households from fuel
poverty. However, if, as we argue, prices are higher than an efficient, competitive market should be delivering,
especially for low-income households, and if nothing is done to tackle the market problems identified in this
report, the cost of energy will remain at punitive levels. This will inevitably have a knock-on effect in driving up
the costs of the energy efficiency measures needed to deal with fuel poverty, as the efficacy of mainstream
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measures is compromised, prompting a shift towards ‘super’ energy efficiency measures. This would mean that
the costs of fuel poverty proofing the fabric of a building would inevitably be higher than would be the case if
energy prices were set at their efficient level. In the short-medium term, tariff and income policies are required
that will assist low-income consumers until such time energy efficiency programmes can identify and assist
them. The need for a fit for purpose energy efficiency programme does not detract from the need to address
the market problems identified here. 
The immediate priority is to get through the next couple of winters without high energy prices leading to major
social and health problems. The number of households now in fuel poverty is likely to top 5 million in the UK.31
Targeted tariff assistance which adheres to appropriate minimum standards has the potential to play a positive
role providing immediate and effective assistance to those most in need. However, if the companies can afford
to put several hundred million pounds (the sort of sum needed to make a significant impact) of genuinely new
money (i.e. not recovered from other consumers) into such schemes, that would pose further questions about
the profit levels that the companies enjoy. If the companies were allowed, or required, to recover the money to
fund social tariffs from other consumers, a permanent cross-subsidy would be needed for this purpose. This
would have to remain in place until such time that energy efficiency interventions had lifted households out of
fuel poverty permanently. 
Some observers32 have argued that a ‘windfall tax’ is justifiable on the grounds that the energy generation
companies (who in nearly all cases are the same companies that also supply consumers) are making
unearned profits. Such unearned profits should, it is argued, be clawed back to benefit those who have been
hit hardest by high energy prices. These profits come from trading emissions certificates issued free of charge
to existing generating stations under the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). However,
given the environmental objectives underpinning the EU ETS, there is likely to be a strong countervailing
argument that any such proceeds should be used to fund initiatives that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Paying to subsidise consumption in the way that providing short-term assistance on energy bills requires,
would be at odds with the objectives of the EU ETS.
If a windfall tax was imposed and the proceeds were directed to providing short-term assistance to pay the
energy bills of those most in need, it could prevent some of the worst consequences of the high energy prices
in the winter of 2008/09. However, it would do nothing to eliminate the structural failings that lie behind the
current problems. It would not deal with the uncompetitive market structure that leads to suspicions whenever
prices rise (or fail to fall) that the companies are exploiting their oligopolistic positions. If it was directed solely
at paying energy bills it would also do nothing to address the poor condition of the British housing stock,
especially that used by low-income households.
One simple measure that could make a useful difference would be to dramatically reduce the differentials
between the payment methods. This might involve raising prices for direct debit consumers but, unless
companies can provide significantly more convincing evidence that existing differentials are justified by cost
differences, this would be a legitimate course of action. The regressive cross-subsidy that is apparent in these
differentials cannot be justified.
In the longer term, the onus is on Ofgem to identify solutions to the serious market deficiencies identified here
and, for example, by the Business & Enterprise Committee. If the outcome of its market probe and the
solutions therein are not satisfactory, the Secretary of State has the power to refer the energy market to the
Competition Commission, should he see fit to do so. It seems unlikely that cosmetic ‘technical fixes’ to the
wholesale market can solve these. The problems seem to lie in the concentrated structure of the market and
this can only be dealt with either by breaking up the companies, or applying much more rigorous regulation so
that companies are not able to exploit their dominant positions.
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Summary of conclusions
This report examines how well competitive markets are serving low-income households when they purchase
essential products and services. It looks at seven sectors, including energy, and attempts to determine whether
lessons for energy can be drawn from the way in which low-income households are dealt with in the other
sectors. The role competitive markets play for these purchases ranges from negligible in the case of water,
which remains a regulated monopoly, to a dominant role, as in the case of food & drink.
The level of specific public support to ensure low-income households are able to secure provision of these
goods and services at a level adequate to ensure their physical and mental well-being also varies markedly.
There is a very extensive and complex support regime provided for the housing sector, while for water, financial
services and food and drink, specific support is very limited. The extent of third sector and industry sponsored
initiatives also varies greatly across sectors.
We conclude that there are significant problems with the operation of the markets in all those sectors we look
at that are, to a greater or less extent, operated as commercial markets. That said, the way in which the water
sector operates (the only remaining regulated monopoly) seems to serve low-income consumers little better.
The nature of the products
Free markets work best under quite specific conditions and for the products and services examined here, these
conditions remain a long way from being met. The prefect market can be portrayed as a large number of
market stalls, all selling identical or near identical goods with prominently displayed prices. This allows the
buyer to easily identify and opt for the cheapest deal, and forces sellers to match the lowest price on offer if
they are to sell any goods. No real market meets this ideal and, of the sectors here, only food and drink could
conceivably come close.
These problems make an efficient search process crucial if consumers are to get the best deal. Access to price
comparison sites and to the internet in general is near essential for the search process. Low-income
households might not enjoy access to an internet-ready computer, or might lack the confidence and/or
competence required to carry out searches effectively. Household circumstances and commitments can also
mean it is difficult to dedicate the time required to carry out such searches.
Corporate concentration
In all the competitive sectors, except housing and perhaps financial services, there is a high degree of
corporate concentration, meaning that consumers only have a limited field of main suppliers to choose from.
This is likely to mean that companies can charge higher prices than would be sustainable in a more
competitive market. Whether this degree of concentration is inevitable is a moot point; for example, scale
economies might give large suppliers such an overwhelming advantage that small companies cannot challenge
this dominance, or even survive in some instances. However, any market with only a handful of main players is
inevitably going to fall into competition authorities’ category of ‘concentrated’ or ‘highly concentrated’. This
generally requires that the dominant companies be broken up to prevent them exploiting their dominant
positions or, if this is not possible or not prudent, that measures be taken to mitigate the market power of these
large companies.
The problem of a concentrated market restricts choice for all classes of consumer but, again, the need for an
efficient search process so that advantage can be taken of the competitive forces that do exist is crucial. Those
low-income consumers who are not in a position to take advantage of competitive forces in this way are left
exposed to inflated prices. 
Sector regulators
The monopoly and former monopoly sectors (water, energy, rail and telecoms) are now regulated by sector
regulators. These have duties to set prices for any remaining monopolies and also to oversee the operation of
their respective markets. In general, these regulators, who have a statutory duty to guard the interests of
consumers, have sought to regulate with a ‘light touch’. This has been encouraged by the government and, in
particular, by its ‘Better Regulation Taskforce’, and also by regulators’ general belief in the efficacy of markets,
which reinforces a reluctance to hamper the action of markets.
In some instances, this light touch seems to have resulted in some regulators failing to take a pro-active
attitude to imposing competition and only intervening when, for example, political and public pressure becomes
overwhelming. This was well illustrated by the apparent reluctance of the energy regulator, Ofgem, to
acknowledge that energy markets were not working well in early 2008. The energy regulator has also been
particularly complacent in allowing a large, regressive price differential to grow between the forms of payment
most often used by low-income households and those most accessible to more affluent households. Pre-
payment meter and standard credit tariffs are on average about 25 per cent higher than on-line direct debit
tariffs, despite there being no evidence that current differentials are justified by higher costs to serve.
Is a regulated monopoly preferable?
The remaining monopoly service, water, is scarcely any better at catering for the needs of low-income
households than the competitive sectors. In theory, a monopoly can, more easily, be regulated to cater for the
interests of low-income consumers. In the competitive sectors, any measures designed to help low-income
households are inevitably portrayed as compromising the market and reducing its efficiency. 
The British government, perhaps because of its political commitment to allow markets to work unhindered,
seems reluctant to impose requirements and conditions on commercial companies. In energy, the government
has demonstrated an increasing reliance on voluntary schemes, even though commercial companies are
unlikely to voluntarily offer enough resources to allow such schemes to make a real difference to low-income
consumers.
Lessons for energy
None of the other six sectors seem to offer straightforward lessons for energy, even though energy appears to
be more systematically stacked against low-income consumers than the other sectors. There is scope in the
future for greater third sector involvement along the lines of that seen in the housing, public transport and
financial service sectors, but this first requires the energy market to evolve to the stage where numerous,
potentially locally focused, ESCOs compete to deliver a comprehensive package of energy services. Such a
development would both complement and be further stimulated by greater development of decentralised
approaches to energy provision. However, if the status quo continues and the retail of units through a national
network remains the norm, all but large scale enterprises are closed out, meaning that non-mainstream
approaches can play only a peripheral role at best. 
This bias that the energy market displays against low-income consumers partly reflects the emphasis this
market places on the need for frequent, resource-intensive searches by consumers to ensure they are getting
the best deal for energy. However, this bias is most readily apparent in the price differentials noted above. If
low-income consumers were charged no more than the price of suppliers’ lowest tariffs, a significant number of
households would no longer fall into the category of fuel-poor.
Government and the regulator seem reluctant to take the measures necessary to either make markets work or,
where markets cannot work, take the necessary steps to protect low-income consumers. 
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Neither the government nor the regulator have acted to prevent the remarkable level of corporate concentration
and integration that has taken place in the past decade. And government seems to be complicit in allowing
further concentration by tacitly encouraging the take-over of the only remaining major independent generation
company by one of the ‘big six’ integrated energy companies.33
Despite professing concern on a number of occasions, neither government nor the regulator have shown the
appetite required to either deal with the blatantly unfair price differentials that impact disproportionately on low-
income households, or to impose mandatory minimum standards on ‘social tariff’ schemes that will ensure
recipients can access tariff rates that are more favourable than suppliers’ open market rates.
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